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Abstract
The author estimates the potential impact of the accession of seven Balkan countries 
(Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) 
to the EU on the agricultural direct payments and rural development expenditures disbur-
sed from the EU budget. The estimation is based on the assumption that the agricultural 
support to GDP ratios are similar across member states at similar levels of development 
sharing a similar weight of agriculture in the economy. The results show that the annu-
al additional burden for the 27 current EU members due to a Balkan enlargement would 
range between EUR 5 and 11.5 billion (in 2004 prices). The former figure reflects an agri-
cultural support to GDP ratio corresponding to the average of the 12 new member sta-
tes; the latter reflects the respective (average) ratio of Bulgaria and Romania. In relative 
terms the Balkan enlargement would necessitate a net increase of the pool of transfers for 
direct payments and rural development expenditures in the range of 10% to 23%. 
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Introduction
Being relatively underdeveloped economies, each of the Balkan 7 countries3 will, after 
accession, be a net recipient of EU funds. But estimating the future agricultural transfers 
from the EU budget to those countries is a complex task.
•  The agricultural support scheme of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), toge-
ther with the UK rebate, has been one of the most controversial issues of the EU 
budget. Its future after 2013 is uncertain. The direction of possible reforms is hard 
to predict. 
•  The possible accession date of all but two countries in the Balkan 7 group (Croatia 
and perhaps Macedonia) is beyond the time frame of the current financial perspec-
tive 2007-2013. Currently, at least three different waves of accession seem to be li-
kely, with Croatia as the earliest, Turkey the latest and the other five countries so-
mewhere in between. Even the group of those other five countries may be split up 
into smaller sub-groups. This means different ‘phasing-in’ periods across different 
financial perspectives and agricultural support schemes.4
•  It is difficult to foresee the future structure of agricultural output in the economies 
of the Balkan 7, which may change in response to any modification of the EU sup-
port scheme there might be.
Methodology
Taking account of these difficulties, the solution proposed constitutes a top-down asse-
ssment of the overall impact of the Balkan 7 accession on the EU budget in general and 
the agricultural section of the EU budget in particular. Consequently, the estimation was 
made without going into the details of the agricultural output in the individual countries. 
Due to the practice of the ten-year phasing-in period5 for direct payments, the proper 
impact on CAP expenditure can be felt only in the tenth year of the membership of any 
new member state. For the countries which joined in 2004 this will be the year 2013, for 
Bulgaria and Romania 2016, for the Balkan 7 well beyond 2016. 
The relevant question is about the transfers in the post-phasing-in period. Here we 
make two assumptions: First, that all new members will be treated equally, and in the 
same way as the former (2004 and 2007) new members. Second, that agricultural support 
from the EU budget will have the same relative size in the Balkan 7 new member states 
as in the former new member states. 
3 The Balkan 7 group includes Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Turkey. Serbian data do not include Kosovo. Due to the missing GDP and other important data for Kosovo, no esti-
mation for the impact on the EU budget was made in the case of a future EU accession of this entity. 
4 Predicted accession dates in Gligorov (2007) partially revised in early 2008 are 2010-2011 for Croatia, 2013-
2014 for Macedonia, 2017 for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia and the period beyond 2015 
for Turkey.
5 New member states joining the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively, received only 25% of the agricultural sup-
port they were entitled to in the first year of membership, but this will gradually increase to 100% by the end of a ten 
year phasing-in period. Most probably this practice will be applied in the Balkan-7 enlargement(s) as well.
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In order to facilitate a comparison across all current member states and the future Balkan 
7 members, a hypothetical EU-34 is considered, comprising Romania and Bulgaria as 
well as the Balkan 7 countries. The working assumption is that the 2004 enlargement 
included Bulgaria, Romania and the Balkan 7. In this hypothetical EU-34, EU-34(hyp) 
for short, the first year of full (post phasing-in) impact on CAP expenditures is uniformly 
2013. The estimated impact in the EU-34(hyp) in 2013 should, under the condition that 
the current CAP scheme prevails, give a rough approximation of the real impact that could 
be exerted in that unknown year in the remote future when the phasing-in of the last 
acceding Balkan 7 member state will have been concluded. Compared to estimates for an 
EU in 2015 (with the beginning of the phasing-in period) or 2025 (full costs with completed 
phasing-in), the creation of the hypothetical EU-34 and the calculation of the relevant full 
costs for 2013 has the advantage that the necessary GDP estimations for the EU total and 
the individual member states, candidates and potential candidates cover a relatively short 
period (2008-2013) while GDP data for the first four years (2004-2007) of the ten-year 
period investigated are already available as facts. This way uncertainties through 
estimations for years in the remote future can be avoided. 
The assessment of the impact is based on GDP data and GDP estimations of the eco-
nomies concerned and further on the available components of the CAP scheme for the 
current EU members for the years 2007-2013: the national ceilings for agricultural direct 
payments in 2007-2013 (European Union 2006a; 2006b)6, and the EU support for rural 
development 2007-20137. It is important to point out that CAP has a third, relatively small 
but by no means negligible component (market and price support) which will not be part 
of the present estimation due to the unpredictability of the item concerned. For this rea-
son, instead of ‘CAP expenditures’, the expression ‘Direct Payments and Rural Develo-
pment expenditures’ (D+R expenditures) will be used in the following. Direct Payments 
data used in the estimation constitute national upper limits; in real life they may be smaller, 
but in this case they reappear in the transfers for Rural Development and thus the D+R 
expenditures used in the estimation do not change.
Further on, the estimation is based on the assumption that the Balkan 7 joined the 
hypothetical EU in 2004 under the same conditions as the current 12 new members. Due 
to the similarities in the level of per capita GDP and the role of agriculture in the econo-
my, the ratio of D+R expenditures to GDP in the 12 new EU member states (NMS-12) 
will be similar to the ratio of hypothetical D+R expenditures to GDP in the case of the 
Balkan 7.
In a first step we estimate the Balkan 7 GDP in 2013. Subsequently we calculate the 
Balkan 7 D+R expenditures in that year, relying on the estimated 2013 D+R expenditu-
re/GDP ratios for the NMS-12. These hypothetical Balkan 7 D+R expenditures can then 
6 These are upper limits of possible transfers under this heading and will not necessarily be equal to actual 
payments. Payments in respect of calendar year (n) are in fact paid under the budget for year (n+1).
7 Pre-allocated rural development funding under Heading 2, ‘Natural Resources’ of the Financial Framework. 
For Bulgaria and Romania: European Commission, http.//europa.eu, for all other member states Official journal of 
the European Union L261/34 22.09.2006. The data include the money transferred from direct aid for farmers to Rural 
Development under the so-called ‘Modulation’.
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be compared to the total hypothetical EU-34 D+R expenditures and the total hypotheti-
cal EU-34 budget expenditures.
It is clear from Table 1 that the Balkan 7 GDP will be somewhat more than half the 
NMS-12 GDP in 2013. Within the Balkan 7 group, the five former Yugoslav republics 
plus Albania will have a smaller combined GDP in 2013 than Hungary, while Turkey will 
have a somewhat higher GDP than Poland. Within the Balkan 7 group, 80% of the com-
bined GDP will be accounted for by Turkey.
Direct payments and rural development expenditures constitute a significant part of 
the total transfers to the member states from the EU budget, amounting to about 42% in 
the period 2007-2013.8 Their significance for the recipient member states, measured by the 
ratio of these transfers to the GDP, differs quite considerably (see Table 2). In the group 
of the old member states that ratio is at 0.3% on average; only the ratio of Greece reaches 
close to 1%. In the group of the ten new (as of 2004) member states the average ratio is 
1.1%, for the 12 new member states together 1.4%. The new members’ significantly hi-
gher ratio (compared to the EU-15) reflects the relatively bigger importance of agricul-
ture in the economies concerned and the lower level of economic development. Note es-
pecially that Bulgaria and Romania will have substantially higher ratios (3.2% and 2.5%, 
respectively) than any of the 2004 new members after phasing-in has been completed. (In 
that group Lithuania will have the highest ratio, 1.7% of its GDP.) 
The results
The D+R expenditures for the Balkan 7 are estimated in two scenarios (see Tables 3 
and 4). In the first scenario we assume that the D+R expenditures to GDP ratio for the Bal-
kan 7 is identical to the average support ratio (1.4%) in the 12 new member states. In the se-
cond scenario the assumption is that this ratio is identical with the average support to GDP 
ratio in Bulgaria and Romania (2.7%). The results of the first scenario show that in 2013 the 
D+R expenditures would be close to 15% higher in a hypothetical EU-34 than in an EU-27, 
namely in an EU without the Balkan 7. Estimated with the higher (Bulgarian–Romanian) 
average ratio of 2.7% the respective agricultural expenditures would be about 28% higher 
with the Balkan 7 than without them. 
Turkey has certainly the dominant weight in the Balkan 7 group. Thus, omitting Tur-
key from the calculation yields a very different result: the D+R support for a hypothetical 
EU-33 without Turkey would only be somewhat more than 3.2% or 6.1%, respectively, 
higher than that for the EU-27.
Additional estimates were made for a case where the D+R support for Croatia was 
calculated with the NMS-12 support to GDP ratio, as Croatia with its substantially higher 
level of development fits better into that group than in the Romania–Bulgaria group. The 
other six countries in the Balkan 7 group were calculated with the higher, 2.7% support 
to GDP ratio (see Table 4). The main proportions would not change substantially in this 
case; the agricultural support for the EU-34 should be about 27% higher than for the EU 
without the Balkan 7. 
8 Overview of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013, http://europa.eu, and Rural Europe, No. 34, January 2006, p. 2. 
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Table 1  GDP by member state in a hypothetical EU-34 in 2013 euro millions, in 2004 
prices
















15 OMS 12,242,785 89.80
Cyprus 18,273 0.13







Slovak Republic 60,176 0.44
Slovenia 40,547 0.30
10 NMS (2004) 762,492 5.59
Bulgaria 32,905 0.24
Romania 99,070 0.73
2 NMS (2007) 131,975 0.97









Balkan 7 495,931 3.64
EU-34 13,633,184 100.00
Source: For the calculation of the 2013 GDP level for individual member states and the EU-34(hyp), factual annual 
growth rates were used for the period 2004-2007. For the new members and the Balkan 7 countries wiiw forecasts for indi-
vidual countries were used for the period 2008-2010. For the period 2011-2013 an annual growth rate of 4.2% was calcula-
ted for each new member, 5.2% for Bulgaria and Romania and each of the Balkan 7 countries. For the old members Eurostat 
Database forecast was used for 2008-2009 and a unified 2.2% growth rate for the period 2010-2013.
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Table 2  Direct payments and rural development expenditures in % of the estimated 



























10 NMS (2004) 1.1
Bulgaria 3.1
Romania 2.5
2 NMS (2007) 2.7
12 NMS 1.4
EU-27 0.4
aUnder the condition that Bulgaria and Romania complete phasing-in of direct payments by 2013 
and not in 2016 as in real life.
Source: Own calculations based on European Union (2006a; 2006b).
The enlargement of the EU by seven new members would also change the allocati-
on across countries. In the EU-27 of 2013 three quarters of the D+R transfers would be 
allocated to old members, about 18% to the ten 2004 new members and 7.4% to the 2007 
new members Romania and Bulgaria (see Table 4). In a hypothetical EU-34 in 2013, 
in which the Balkan 7 support to GDP ratio would correspond to the NMS-12 average 
(1.4%), the 27 current member states would receive 87.3% of the D+R support and the 
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Balkan 7 12.7%. In the scenario with the higher (2.7%) support to GDP ratio, the share 
of support allocated to the Balkan 7 would be close to 22% of the total. This share would 
be higher than that of the NMS-12 (less than 20%). The share of the old members would 
be less than 60%. Turkey’s share alone would amount to over 17%, close to the share of 
support for the NMS 12. 
Table 4  Direct payments and rural development expenditures in a hypothetical EU-34 in 2013










in % EUR 
mn
in %  EUR
 mn
in %  EUR
 mn
in %
OMS-15 35,604 74.6 35.604 65.1 35,604 58.3 35,604 58.8
 10 NMS (2004) 8,591 18.0 8.591 15.7 8,591 14.1 8,591 14.2
  2 NMS (2007) 3,526 7.4 3.526 6.4 3,526 5.8 3,526 5.8
  12 NMS 12,117 25.4 12.117 22.2 12,117 19.8 12,117 20,0
EU-27 47,721 100 47.721 87.3 47,721 78.1 47,721 78.8
Croatia 621 1.1 1,197 2.0 621 1.0
Albania 135 0.2 260 0.4 260 0.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 178 0.3 344 0.6 344 0,6
Macedonia 94 0.2 182 0.3 182 0.3
Montenegro 39 0.1 75 0.1 75 0,1
Serbia 449 0.8 866 1,4 866 1.4
Turkey 5.427 9.9 10,466 17.1 10,466 17.3
Balkan 7 6.943 12.7 13,390 21.9 12,814 21.2
EU-34 (EU-27 + Balkan-7) 54.664 100 61,111 100 60,535 100
Source: Own calculations.
Table 3  Estimated direct payments and rural development expenditures for the
Balkan 7 in a hypothetical EU-34 in 2013 EUR million
Country GDP D+R expenditure, if the ratio to GDP is equal to:
1.4% (NMS 12) 2.7% (Bulgaria and Romania)
Croatia 44.329 621 1.197
Albania 9.625 135 260
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 12.723 178 344
Macedonia 6.739 94 182
Montenegro 2.789 39 75
Serbia 32.080 449 866
Turkey 387.647 5.427 10.466
Balkan 7 495.931 6.943 13.390
Source: Own calculations.
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In all the above calculations the assumption prevailed that the D+R expenditures for 
the member states will increase when the Balkan 7 join the EU. This, however, will not be 
necessarily so and we therefore calculate a ‘meagre’ version of enlargement in which the 
D+R expenditures earmarked for the EU-27 do not increase after the EU accession of the 
Balkan 7. In that case, the resources allocated originally to the EU-27 will be reallocated 
among 34 members. Provided that each member state is treated equally and thus the reduc-
tion of R+D expenditures takes place at a uniform rate, the member states will lose 13% of 
their transfers if the 1.4% support/GDP ratio is applied and 22% if the higher 2.7% ratio is 
applied to the Balkan 7 (see Table 5). In a version omitting Turkey the loss for the individu-
al member states will amount to 3% and 6%, respectively (see Table 6).
So far we have investigated the impact on agricultural transfers that an EU accessi-
on of the Balkan 7 would have. Next we attempt to asses the overall budgetary impact of 
the Balkan 7 accession in the field of agriculture (see Table 7). The estimated 2013 GDP 
data for the EU-27 and the hypothetical EU-34, respectively, allow a calculation of the 
rate of expansion of the EU aggregate GDP due to the increase in the number of mem-
ber states from 27 to 34. 
Since the Balkan 7 are relatively poor, the 2013 GDP of the EU-34(hyp) would only 
be 3.8% higher than that of the EU-27 (line C in Table 7). If agricultural expenditures 
were to increase at the same rate, by 3.8%, the enlargement from 27 to 34 members would 
have practically no impact. 
These 3.8% higher agricultural expenditures may be regarded as the enlarged EU’s 
‘supply’ of agricultural support at a scale which would not generate an additional burden 
for the EU-27 as a group. Nevertheless, the strongly agricultural economies of the Bal-
kan 7 necessitate a more than 3.8% increase in D+R expenditures. Further above an esti-
mation was made for two scenarios applying two different R+D expenditure to GDP rati-
os. This may be interpreted as the Balkan 7 ‘demand’ for EU agricultural support if they 
were to be treated roughly equally to the NMS-12 or Romania and Bulgaria, respective-
ly. The difference between the impact-neutral EU-34 ‘supply’ and the EU-34 ‘demand’ 
amounts to EUR 5.1 billion or EUR 11.5 billion, respectively, depending on the NMS re-
ference group selected (lines J and K in Table 7). Turkey’s net impact amounts to 78.2% 
of the above figures, EUR 4 billion and EUR 9 billion, respectively (calculation based 
on figures in Table 3).
In another approach, the EU accession of the Balkan 7, if they were treated equally 
to the NMS-12 or Romania and Bulgaria, would raise the D+R expenditures out of the 
EU budget by 10.3% or 23.3%, respectively (see lines L and M in Table 7). This can be 
interpreted as the net impact of the Balkan 7 accession on the D+R expenditures.
Finally, if we assume that in 2013 the budget of the hypothetical EU-34’s own reso-
urces (the revenue side of the EU budget) will amount to 1% of the EU-34 GDP9, we can 
estimate the emerging additional need for the overall financing of the EU budget due to 
the additional costs from R+D expenditures for the Balkan 7. Assuming that total EU bud-
9 In the real life EU-27 own resources in 2013 will amount to 1% of the EU-27 GNI, in terms of payment appro-
priations.
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get revenues are equal to total EU budget expenditures,10 the figures presented in Table 7 
indicate that total budgetary expenditures of the EU-34(hyp) will be close to 4% or more 
than 8% higher than the total budgetary expenditures of the EU-27 if, in the field of agri-
culture, the Balkan 7 is treated in the same way as the NMS-12 or Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, respectively (see lines P and S in Table 7) . Again, the lion’s share of these additional 
costs derives from Turkey’s accession. In a hypothetical EU-33 (EU 27+Balkan 7 witho-
ut Turkey) the total budgetary expenditures would only be about 1% (1.4% R+D expen-
ditures to GDP ratio) or close to 2% (2.7% R+D expenditures to GDP ratio) higher than 
in the EU-27 (see lines R and T in Table 7). 
If we project these costs on the aggregate GDP of the hypothetical EU-34, the result 
indicates that instead of 1% of GDP transferred to the EU budget, the member states sho-
10 In real life own resources are about 6% higher than expenditures due to expenditures spent in other than EU 
member states (pre-accession aid, international aid programmes, etc.).
Table 5  Direct payments and rural development expenditures in a hypothetical EU-34 
in 2013, the ‘meagre’ version
Member State EU-27 EU-34 (1.4%) EU-34 (2.7%)





EUR mn in % EUR mn in % EUR mn in %
OMS-15 35,604 74,6 35,604 31,082 65.1 35.604 27,803 58.3
   10 NMS (2004) 8,591 18 8,591 7,500 15.7 8.591 6,709 14.1
   2 NMS (2007) 3,526 7,4 3,526 3,078 6.5 3.526 2,753 5.8
12 NMS 12,117 25,4 12,117 10,578 22.2 12.117 9,462 19.8
EU-27 47,721 100 47,721 41,660 87.3 47.721 37,265 78.1
Croatia  621 542 1.1 1.197 935 2.0
Albania  135 118 0.2 260 203 0.4
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  178 155 0.3 344 269 0.6
Macedonia  94 82 0.2 182 142 0.3
Montenegro  39 34 0.1 75 59 0.1
Serbia  449 392 0.8 866 676 1.4
Turkey  5,427 4738 9.9 10.466 8,173 17.1
Balkan-7  6.943 6.061 12.7 13.390 10,456 21.9
EU-34 (EU-27 + 
Balkan-7)   54,664 47,721 100.0 61.111 47,721 100.0
Ratio EU 34 ‘meagre’ 
to EU 34 baseline   0.87   0.78  
Source: own calculations
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uld transfer 1.037% or 1.081%, respectively, of their GDP to finance the increased EU 
budgetary outlays as a (partial, agricultural) consequence of Balkan 7 membership in the 
EU (see lines U and V in Table 7).
Other estimations for Turkey
Turkey, the biggest and in many respects the most ̀ difficult` of the candidate and poten-
tial candidate countries for EU membership, has already been the subject of research con-
cerning the budgetary implications of its EU accession in general and its integration in the 
current form of the CAP system in particular. 
The European Commission’s estimation is €8.3 billion for the first and second pillar 
of CAP; deducting the market and price support (€0.7 billion) from the former item we 
arrive to the result €7.6 billion (in 2025, fully phased in, in 2004 prices). 
Table 6  Direct payments and rural development expenditures in a hypothetical EU-33 
in 2013, the ‘meagre’ version without Turkey
Member State EU-27 EU-33 (1.4%) EU-33 (2.7%) 
 base line base 
linej
“meagre” base line “meagre”
EUR mn in % EUR mn in % EUR mn in %
OMS-15 35,604 74.6 35,604 34,508 72.3 35,604 33,548 70.3
   10 NMS (2004) 8,591 18.0 8,591 8,326 17.4 8,591 8,095 17.0
   2 NMS (2007) 3,526 7.4 3,526 3,417 7.2 3,526 3,322 7.0
12 NMS 12,117 25.4 12,117 11,744 24.6 12,117 11,417 23.9
EU-27 47,721 100 47,721 46,252 96.9 47,721 44,966 94.2
Croatia  621 602 1.3 1,197 1,128 2.4
Albania  135 131 0.3 260 245 0.5
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  178 173 0.4 344 324 0.7
Macedonia  94 91 0.2 182 171 0.4
Montenegro  39 38 0.1 75 71 0.1
Serbia  449 435 0.9 866 816 1.7
Balkan-6
(without Turkey)  1,516 1,469 3.1 2,924 2,755 5.8
EU-33 (EU-27 + 
Balkan-6)  49,237 47,721 100.0 50,645 47,721 100.0
Ratio EU 33 ‘meagre’ 
to EU 33 baseline  0.97 0.94  
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Dervis et al (2004) made their estimation based on the estimated EU GDP growth, 
possible share of the CAP in EU budgetary expenditures and possible share of Turkey 
in the overall CAP expenditures and overall EU budgetary expenditures. Their result is 
€9 billion (maximum cost) in terms of CAP receipts for Turkey (in 2015, in case of full 
membership, at 2004 prices) . 
Oskam et al (2004) elaborated a synthetic estimate from other available estimates. In 
this synthetic estimation the budgetary items comparable with those estimated in our study 
(first and second pillar of CAP) amounts to €7.5 billion (at 2004 prices, after phasing-in 
completed). The authors’ (Oskam et al) own estimation based on a bottom-up methodo-
logy for direct payments (estimating direct payments one by one for individual products) 
Table 7  Impact (only agriculture) of Balkan 7 EU membership n total EU budgetary 
expenditures in a hypothetical EU-34
A  GDP (2013) EU-27 (euro million) 13,137,253 
B  GDP (2013) EU-34 (euro million) 13,633,184 
C  GDP Expansion EU-34/27 (A/B*100) (in %) 103.8
D  EU-27 D+R expenditures (euro million) 47,721 
E   EU-34 D+R expenditures (impact neutral ‘supply’) (D*1.038) (EUR 
million) 49,534 
F   Balkan 7 ‘demand’ for D+R (1.4% of GDP) (euro million) 6,943 
G  Balkan 7 ’demand’ for D+R (2.7% of GDP) (euro million) 13,390 
H  EU-34 demand for D+R (1.4%of GDP) (D+F) (euro million) 54,664 
I   EU-34 demand for D+R (2.7 %of GDP) (D+G) (euro million) 61,111 
J    Difference EU-34 impact neutral supply and EU-34 demand (1.4%) (E-H) 
(euro million) -5,082 
K   Difference EU-34 impact neutral supply and EU-34 demand (2.7%) (E-I) 
(euro million) -11,529 
L  Proportion of EU-34 demand (1.4%) to impact neutral ‘supply’ (H/E) 1.103
M  Proportion of EU-34 demand (2.7%) to impact neutral ‘supply’ (I/E) 1.233
N   Share of preservation & management of Natural Resources in total 
expenditures in 2013 (in %) 40.4
O  Total EU-34 expenditure (1.00% of the EU GDP) (euro million) 136,332 
P   Increase of total expenditures due to excessive demand for agricultural 
support (1.4%) (-1*J+O/O) (in %) 103.7
R  without Turkey (in %) 101.0
S   Increase in total expenditures due to excessive demand for agricultural 
support (2.7%) (-1*K+O/O) (in %) 108.1
T  without Turkey (in %) 101.9
U   Total budgetary expenditures in % of EU 34 GDP if agricultural support 
(1.4%) [(P/100)*O]/B 1.037
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concludes in lower figures. The expenditures for pillar 1 and 2 amounts to €5.0 billion (at 
2004 prices, after phasing-in completed). 
Grethe (2005a) arrives in his estimation at €5.3 billion (2004 prices, 2015 member-
ship, Turkey fully phased in) EU budgetary costs for direct payments and rural develo-
pment for Turkey, based on a bottom up methodology. 
Quaisser and Wood (2004) accept the European Commission’s estimation. 
All these results are within the two values estimated above for Turkey in terms of 
net impact (€4 billion and €9 billion, respectively depending on the D+R expenditure to 
GDP ratio selected).
Conclusions
Any predictions concerning the agricultural transfers to the future EU members in 
the period after 2013 are made quite unreliable by a number of uncertainties; we there-
fore chose to estimate those transfers in the context of a hypothetical EU-34 in the year 
2013.
The top-down estimation was based on the assumption that the agricultural support 
to GDP ratios are similar across member states at similar levels of development sharing a 
similar weight of agriculture in the economy. The results show that the annual additional 
burden, in terms of direct payments and rural development expenditures, for the 27 cu-
rrent EU members due to the EU membership of the seven Balkan countries would range 
between EUR 5 and 11.5 billion (in 2004 prices). The former figure reflects an agricultu-
ral support to GDP ratio corresponding to the average of the 12 new member states; the 
latter reflects the respective (average) ratio of Bulgaria and Romania. As the members 
of the Balkan 7 group, aside from Croatia, are in many respects more similar to Bulgaria 
and Romania than to the more developed new members of 2004, the additional burden 
will probably be closer to the higher than to the lower figure.
In relative terms the hypothetical accession of the Balkan 7 in 2004 would necessi-
tate a net increase of the pool of transfers for direct payments and rural development ex-
penditures in the range of 10% to 23%. Alternatively, if that pool were not to be expan-
ded, present members would lose about 13% or 22%, respectively, of the transfers com-
pared to those eligible for them in an EU without the Balkan 7.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the Balkan 7 group is far from being homogene-
ous in terms of additional expenditures generated by the EU accession of the individual 
members of the group. Close to 80% of the additional expenditures are accounted for by 
Turkey alone. While the integration of the former Yugoslav republics and Albania into 
the CAP seems likely to cause only a moderate increase of expenditures, the accession of 
Turkey may necessitate a new design of agricultural policies in the EU.
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